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n Ethics for a Broken World,1 Tim Mulgan invites us to partake 
in a series of lectures delivered in a fictional future on some 
of the political philosophies that dominate our current 
tradition. The future he asks us to imagine is one in which the 
world is ‘broken’. In the broken world, climate change has lead to 
intermittent and unpredictable periods of radical scarcity in which 
there are insufficient resources to guarantee the survival of all 
existing persons (8-12). We are also to imagine, rather plausibly in 
light of recent scientific discoveries, that we bear causal 
responsibility for this situation (9). Mulgan suggests that the 
device of the broken world ‘serves to highlight the contingency of 
our moral and political ideals, asking us to see our society and its 
ideals from the outside’ (ix). In this paper, I employ the device of 
the broken world to reflect on one of the most prominent ideals 
in contemporary affluent societies, namely that of human rights. 
In particular, I am interested in what sense the device of the 
broken world shows our ideal of human rights to be contingent, 
 
1 T. Mulgan, Ethics for a Broken World: Imagining Philosophy After Catastrophe 
(Montreal & Kingston-Itacha: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011). All 
page references in the text refer to this volume. 
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and what implications this might have for how we should 
understand and evaluate this ideal. 
My focus will be on human rights as a political ideal.2 
According to this ideal, all political institutions should be 
structured so as to respect and promote a set of particularly 
important rights, namely human rights, and it is incumbent on all 
moral agents to ensure that political institutions fulfill this 
requirement. There is substantial disagreement over how the 
content of human rights is determined,3 and yet there is 
significant convergence on at least a core set of human rights, 
which finds expression notably in the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).4 These rights include 
 
2 The fulfillment of human rights is widely accepted to be a political ideal, 
although it is also taken by many to be a moral ideal. Some theorists reject this 
view in favour of the view that human rights are essentially political. See, for 
example, Andrea Sangiovanni, ‘Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 16 (2008), 137-164; and Charles Beitz, The Idea of 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). I hope to avoid this 
debate here by focusing on human rights as a political ideal. 
3 We can identify two main factions: On the one hand are those who think that 
the content of the rights of international human rights doctrine should be 
derived from a more abstract set of universal moral rights. See, for example, 
James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 2008); and 
John Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, in Freedom from Poverty as 
a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?, ed. by Thomas Pogge (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, UNESCO, 2007), pp. 75-100. On the other hand are 
those who think that the content of human rights is justified with reference to 
the point and purpose of the practices governed by human rights norms, and 
the role these norms play within these practices. See, for example, Sangiovanni 
and Beitz. These two factions fragment further in light of disagreements 
respectively over the grounding values of universal moral rights, and how to 
interpret human rights practice. 
4 The complete text of the UDHR can be accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. I focus on the UDHR because it is 
the centrepiece of international human rights doctrine, which now constitutes 
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rights to life, liberty, and security of person, rights against slavery, 
torture, and inhumane punishment, rights to due process and 
equality before the law, rights to nationality and freedom of 
movement, rights to freedom of conscience, religion, association, 
and expression, the right to own property, the right to marry and 
found a family, rights to political participation, rights to work and 
to decent working conditions, and rights to basic resources, 
education, and healthcare. In what follows, when I refer to 
human rights, I mean the set of rights articulated in the UDHR 
and other official human rights documents unless otherwise 
specified. 
Human rights have come to dominate the discourse on global 
political morality. They are used to criticize the actions and 
policies of states and their officials, and they are appealed to as 
grounds for undermining the sovereignty of states through 
various forms of intervention. The rhetoric of human rights is 
used to characterize serious injustices and constitutes a call to 
action on the part of those who are in a position to agitate for 
change. The ideal of human rights finds widespread support in 
our world. But what does it look like from the perspective of the 




The claim of Mulgan’s fictional lecturer that ‘[a]ffluent people 
were obsessed with rights’ (18) suggests that people in the broken 
world are not. This highlights one sense in which the ideal of 
human rights is contingent, namely in that we have come to hold 
                                                                                                                             
an extensive body of mainly legal documents that seek, in general, to specify 
and in some cases extend the rights of the UDHR. 
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it as an ideal as a result of the social circumstances in which we 
find ourselves and the history that has lead to them. The fact that 
we hold the ideals we do, including the ideal of human rights, is 
surely contingent in this way. We know that people have not 
always recognized human rights as an ideal, and we have reason 
to think that we might never have come to recognize this ideal, 
had history taken a different course. And although we do not 
know what the future will bring, there is no reason to rule out the 
possibility that it will take a course that leads to human rights no 
longer being recognized as an ideal, as is the case in the broken 
world Mulgan envisions. 
We should not find this ‘historical’ contingency either 
surprising or troubling for our ideal of human rights. The fact 
that we might not have come to hold this ideal or that people in 
the future might come to reject it does not suggest that we lack 
reason to hold it now. Ideals can be justified non-contingently 
even if we only came to recognize them as result of contingent 
circumstances and histories. We find a parallel in the way we 
think about scientific principles: We may have discovered them 
because of contingent circumstances (some were even discovered 
by accident), but this does not make their truth contingent on the 
circumstances that lead to their discovery. Something similar 
might be the case for at least some of our moral and political 
ideals. We might think, for example, that slavery was wrong even 
when it was considered socially acceptable because slavery is 
always and non-contingently wrong. The fact that slavery was 
considered socially acceptable might serve to partially excuse 
those who engaged in the practice, but it does not do away with 
the wrongness of it.  
Historical contingency can be distinguished from a second 
sense in which an ideal might be contingent. In this second sense, 
an ideal is contingent if the justification for holding it as an ideal 
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depends on particular circumstances obtaining. We can refer to 
this kind of contingency as ‘justificatory’ contingency. An 
important insight gained from Mulgan’s discussions of our 
contemporary ideals from the perspective of the broken world is 
that many of our ideals are contingent in this way, from the 
libertarian ideal of minimal government and the nationalist ideal 
of territorial rights to the more moderate liberal ideals endorsed 
by rule utilitarians and Rawlsians. These and other ideals are 
undermined by the conditions of radical scarcity characteristic of 
the broken world. 
This looks to be true of many of the human rights whose 
fulfillment we take to be a political ideal. Perhaps most obviously 
problematic are the socio-economic rights expressed in the 
UDHR and repeated (and sometimes expanded) in other human 
rights documents. How, for example, could political institutions 
be structured in such a way as to ensure that everyone enjoys ‘a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family’ (Article 25.1) when resources are 
insufficient to ensure that everyone has enough to survive? How 
could guarantees of free education (Article 26.1), free choice of 
employment (Article 23.1), and ‘periodic holidays with pay’ 
(Article 24) be possible in conditions of radical scarcity? And how 
could inhabitants of the broken world justify a right to found a 
family (Article 16.1) when this would only mean more mouths to 
feed that cannot ultimately be fed? We should note that the 
conditions of radical scarcity would also make a number of other 
rights difficult to justify and secure. For example, the legal 
institutions necessary for the fulfillment of due process rights 
(Articles 10 and 11) are extremely costly to operate. Whereas in 
affluent conditions, the fulfillment of all human rights is possible, 
in conditions of radical scarcity, we would be faced with the 
question of whether to forego due process rights in favour of 
devoting more resources to food production or medicine.  
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Our ideal of human rights, then, looks to be contingent on 
conditions of affluence. But contingency poses a special challenge 
for human rights, which are meant to be universal. The 
universality of human rights is expressed in the very title of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but we also find in it the 
assertion contained therein, that ‘Everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind’ (Article 2). Reflecting on human rights 
from the perspective of the broken world encourages us to clarify 
the sense in which human rights are universal. How can the 
alleged universality of human rights be squared with their 




One possibility is to deny that the infeasibility of the 
realization of human rights for all persons in the broken world 
makes human rights a contingent ideal. On this view, each 
inhabitant of the broken world has the same set of human rights 
as we do, but these rights simply cannot be fulfilled, at least not 
all at once and for everyone. On this kind of view, human rights 
might be thought to provide guidance for institutions to 
approximate the minimal conditions for justice, despite the fact 
that institutions in the broken world could never fully meet these 
conditions.  
It might be objected that there is little value in pursuing strictly 
unattainable ideals. But ideals are meant to orient our actions, and 
there is no reason to think that unattainable ideals are always 
ineffective in this respect. I can know that I will never be able to 
play the piano as well as Glenn Gould, but I can look to his 
performances as exemplars and use them to orient my training. 
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Why, then, not think that the inhabitants of the broken world 
could model their institutions on our ideal of human rights 
despite knowing that they will never succeed in attaining it?  
The problem with this idea, I argue, is that it is not clear how 
inhabitants of a broken world should orient themselves towards 
our ideal of human rights. Recall that according to our ideal of 
human rights, political institutions must be structured in such a 
way as to ensure the fulfillment of human rights for all their 
members. In the broken world, there are insufficient resources to 
achieve this. A natural thought is that political institutions in the 
broken world should approximate our ideal of human rights by 
seeking to maximize the fulfillment of human rights of their 
members. But what would the maximization of human rights 
entail? Suppose that resources in the broken world are adequate 
to fulfill some human rights for everyone. Would this be the closest 
approximation of our ideal? Why not instead use the available 
resources to fulfill all human rights for some people, and none for 
others? Or why not fulfill all human rights for a very few, a very 
limited number of human rights for some, and none for the rest? 
Each of these options would involve maximizing the fulfillment 
of human rights in some sense, but it is not clear which one best 
approximates our ideal of human rights in the broken world.  
Indeed there is reason to doubt that maximizing the 
fulfillment of human rights in any sense is the right way to avoid 
injustice in the broken world at all. In the affluent world, our ideal 
of human rights is a kind of sufficientarian principle that limits 
just political institutions to those under which everyone’s human 
rights are fulfilled. Not only does this leave an enormous amount 
of variation in the possible institutional arrangements and the 
distributions that they allow, it also allows for individuals to attain 
standards of living far higher than the mere fulfillment of human 
rights. But this is not the case in the broken world. Maximizing 
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the fulfillment of human rights would leave no resources for the 
pursuit of other ends. Maximizing human rights in the broken 
world would mean that the mere fulfillment of human rights 
would be the highest standard of living anyone could hope to 
attain.  
The fulfillment of human rights as a minimal standard for the 
justice of political institutions loses its appeal under these 
conditions of radical scarcity. Some people might reasonably 
prefer to have a lower chance of survival in exchange for a higher 
standard of living should they survive.5 Some might, in other 
words, reasonably prefer a smaller chance at a standard of living 
higher than that of the mere fulfillment of human rights than they 
would have if as many people as possible were guaranteed human 
rights fulfillment. It seems that a reasonable standard of justice 
for political institutions in the broken world should accommodate 
this kind of preference. This would mean that the maximization 
of human rights could actually end up undermining justice in the 
broken world. Our ideal of human rights thus looks to be 




But what, then, of the supposed universality of human rights? 
When we say that human rights are universal, we cannot mean 
that they are held by all humans and that their fulfillment is a 
requirement of political institutions in all times and places. The 
universality of human rights must be bounded. The idea of 
bounded universality is not unfamiliar. For example, when a state 
 
5 This point draws on Mulgan’s discussions of libertarian and Rawlsian survival 
lotteries, pp. 62-64 and pp. 189-192. 
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offers universal health care, this just means that health care is 
provided to all those who qualify as members of that state in the 
relevant sense (of example, as citizens or residents). The 
universality of human rights, however, is often thought to imply 
that the relevant boundaries are those of humanity: What makes 
human rights human rights is that they are held universally by all 
humans, and not confined only to those living in particular 
societies. I have shown that the infeasibility of fulfilling human 
rights in the broken world challenges this view, and suggests that 
the universality of human rights must be bounded by conditions 
of affluence.6   
I argue, however, that this need not make human rights 
obsolete in the broken world for at least two reasons. One is that 
inhabitants of the broken world could articulate the injustice of 
their situation in terms of human rights. Assuming that their 
plight would be at least partly the foreseeable result of the 
avoidable actions of current and past generations, inhabitants of 
the broken world could argue that the failure of our political 
institutions to prevent these harmful actions constituted a 
violation of their human rights. This is because where feasibility is 
the only allowable constraint on human rights, as long as it is 
feasible to ensure the fulfillment of human rights of future 
generations, the failure to do contravenes our ideal of human 
rights.7 This is true even if it turns out that inhabitants of the 
 
6 John Tasioulas outlines a similar version of the bounded universality of 
human rights in ‘Human Rights, Universality, and the Values of Personhood: 
Retracing Griffin's Steps’, European Journal of Philosophy, 10 (2002), pp. 79-100. 
7 For a detailed discussion of how our failure to mitigate dangerous climate 
change might constitute a violation of the human rights of future people, see 
Simon Caney, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds’, in 
Climate Ethics: Essential Reading, ed. by Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, 
Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 
163-177. 
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broken world cannot reasonably pursue our ideal of human rights 
for themselves.  
A second way in which human rights could be relevant for 
people in the broken world is in a more abstracted form. I have 
so far been using ‘human rights’ to refer to the specific set of 
rights included in international human rights doctrine. We can 
distinguish this substantive sense of ‘human rights’ from a more 
formal sense that focuses instead on the normative role that 
human rights play. In this sense, we might refer to human rights 
as the set of rights that all political institutions must fulfill in 
order to be minimally just, and that ensuring they do so is in 
some sense everyone’s business. Although I have provided 
reasons for thinking that the particular set of human rights that 
form our ideal of human rights cannot fulfill this role in the 
broken world, there is reason to think that some other set of 
rights will.  
Furthermore, there is reason to think that the justification of 
this set of rights will be similar to the justification for the human 
rights of our ideal. The human rights of our ideal are justified by 
the idea that failing to respect them constitutes a failure to 
appropriately respect the moral status of persons.8 What counts 
as a failure to respect a person’s moral status will depend in part 
of the circumstances. For example, to deny someone access to 
the means for subsistence might be construed as a failure to 
respect her moral status under affluent conditions, but this could 
not plausibly constitute such a failure of respect in the broken 
world. Nevertheless, there will be other ways in which people’s 
moral status can fail to be respected in the broken world. 
Denying someone access to the means for subsistence might not 
 
8 I take it that this is a unifying thought that is compatible with the 
disagreements, which I mentioned in section 1, over the specific values that 
ultimately ground human rights. 
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constitute a failure to respect a person’s moral status in the 
broken world, but denying him access to the means for 
subsistence simply because of his ethnicity plausibly would count 




Reflecting on our ideal of human rights from the perspective 
of the broken world shows it to be contingent on conditions of 
affluence. I have argued that we can, nevertheless, make sense of 
the universality of human rights in at least two ways. One 
involves the idea that our ideal of human rights is only bounded 
by feasibility constraints. This, I have argued, has important 
implications for how we think about our obligations to future 
generations. Second, we find that a formal sense of ‘human rights’ 
is not burdened by the same contingency as the substantive sense. 
This leaves room for an ideal of human rights for the broken 
world that is, in some ways, continuous with ours.  
There is a great deal more that can be said about human rights 
in the broken world, and how we should think about our 
obligations towards future people with respect to their human 
rights. My purpose in this brief paper has been to point to some 
of the ways in which the device of the broken world can help to 
orient our thinking about human rights as a political ideal both 
now and in the future. 
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